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Abstract: There is growing recognition that sustainable intensification of agricultural 
production systems and their successful adaptation to changes in climate will depend upon 
the improved access to, and use of, genetic diversity. This paper analyzes how the 
collection, use and distribution of plant genetic resources by the Consortium of 
International Research Centers of the CGIAR are influenced by international and national 
policies, treaties and agreements. Some concerns exist among CGIAR scientists about 
continued access to, and distribution of, plant genetic resources. Study findings point to an 
increasing influence of international and national policies and legal frameworks on the 
conservation and use of plant genetic resources for food and agriculture (PGRFA) by the 
CGIAR centers and the dissemination of CGIAR-improved germplasm first to partners in 
agricultural research organizations and then to final users of new plant varieties developed 
through research partnerships. This situation may, in the longer term, have a serious impact 
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on the utilization of plant genetic diversity to cope with current and predicted challenges to 
agricultural production and, in particular, climate change. 
Keywords: plant genetic resources; policies; access and benefit-sharing; intellectual 
property rights; partnerships; technology development and dissemination 
 
1. Introduction 
Plant genetic resources for food and agriculture (PGRFA) are strategic goods for crop improvement 
through farmer selection, conventional plant breeding and modern biotechnological techniques. Crop 
improvement enables agriculture adaptation to biotic and environmental changes as well as the 
development of new foods and new uses. Supportive policies and laws could create an enabling 
environment for the use of plant genetic resources in crop improvement, and for the adoption of 
improved plant varieties by farmers. The International Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources for Food and 
Agriculture (ITPGRFA) stresses the commitment of its member countries to put in place policies and 
legal frameworks that facilitate the conservation, exchange and sustainable use of such resources, but, to 
date, detailed discussion of the actual content of such policies and legal frameworks has been sparse [1]. 
The Consortium of International Research Centers of the CGIAR is a global partnership that unites 15 
centers engaged in agricultural research, working in collaboration with partner organizations, including 
national and regional research institutes, civil society organizations, academia, and the private sector. 
The centers of the CGIAR have new opportunities to coordinate international efforts to conserve, 
improve and use plant genetic resources. Positioned at the nexus of national agricultural research 
organizations (NAROs), international and national research institutes, and private sector and civil 
society organizations, including farmer associations, they are uniquely situated to contribute to crop 
improvement in view of current and predicted challenges such as climate change adaptation, steady 
population increase and globalization of food crop markets. CGIAR centers’ experience with policy, 
partnerships, germplasm diffusion and use strategies are likely relevant to a broad range of 
organizations who work with plant genetic resources and who seek effective approaches to address 
these challenges through an enhanced conservation and use of plant genetic resources. 
To date, there has not been a collective stock-taking of how the CGIAR centers have modified the 
management and use of plant genetic resources in response to evolving policies and legal frameworks. 
In the context and with the support of the CGIAR Programme on Climate Change, Agricultural and 
Food Security (CCAFS), the authors aimed to address this “gap” through an analysis of how the 
collection, use and distribution of plant genetic resources for food and agriculture by the CGIAR 
centers may be changing in response to the changes in policies. The key question this paper addresses 
is: What policies support or impede the efforts of the CGIAR centers and their partners to access, use 
and distribute plant genetic resources? By answering this question, this paper aims to provide useful 
insights for the design and evaluation of policies that effectively support the use of crop diversity for 
dealing with current and future challenges to agricultural production. Initially, this study paid 
particular attention to climate change as a driver of transformation of CGIAR centers’ activities on 
conservation and improvement of PGRFA, and analyzed the influence of policies and legal 
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frameworks on such activities in the light of the centers’ and their partners’ needs to adapt to climate 
change. Our findings indicate that climate change has not radically changed breeding priorities and 
approaches in the CGIAR, and that existing policies do not (yet) have a differential impact on the 
centers’ activities and technologies related to climate change adaptation. 
The paper starts with an explanation of how the CGIAR gene banks and breeding programs operate, 
with a particular attention to recent changes in the centers’ approach to technology generation and 
dissemination. We then describe how certain policies affect the centers’ conservation and use of plant 
genetic resources, followed by a synthesis of the findings and an analysis of their significance. 
2. Analytical Framework 
For practical reasons, we conceptually divide our analysis according to the patterns of germplasm 
flow into, within and out of the CGIAR centers as represented in a schematic form in Figure 1. For the 
purposes of our analysis, we differentiate between the experiences of gene banks acquiring, analyzing, 
conserving and distributing germplasm and the experiences of the breeders and breeding programs. 
Figure 1. Germplasm flows in and out of the CGIAR. Source: the authors. 
 
The CGIAR centers operate in a wider, external institutional context that includes international and 
national policies and laws (for example, those concerning agricultural biodiversity, plant genetic 
resources, seed systems, trade, technology and intellectual property rights), funding priorities, 
capacities and rules of donor agencies and programming agendas of development agencies. 
Our study draws on a combination of two types of models, known as knowledge systems and social 
actor approaches [2]. According to the first model, we analyze the institutional and organizational 
structures and mechanisms through which knowledge and germplasm are generated and disseminated 
among the actors at various levels and locations. This assessment is then combined with an analysis of 
how the key social actors—in this case, gene bank managers, breeders, intellectual property right (IPR) 
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specialists, extension agents, NGO staff and farmers—actively take part in, and make decisions about, 
the use, management and conservation of germplasm. 
3. Methodology 
This study is based on data and information gathered from three main sources. Firstly, to provide 
background for the study, the project team conducted an extensive review of both the academic and 
grey literatures to establish a framework for the analysis and to identify specific issues for further  
in-depth exploration. Four key topics were identified: (1) strategies and channels for the dissemination 
of improved germplasm; (2) factors influencing the uptake of crop technologies; (3) impacts of 
intellectual property rights and access and benefit-sharing policies on agricultural research; and (4) the 
CGIAR centers’ collaborations with the private sector. The literature was also referenced after the 
completion of the primary data collection. 
Secondly, the research team collected and analyzed data on germplasm acquisition and distribution 
by the CGIAR gene banks and breeding programs. Analysis provided an overview of the extent and 
coverage of CGIAR-facilitated germplasm flows. Finally, the team conducted 70 personal interviews 
with scientists who are directly involved in germplasm research and management in eight CGIAR 
centers [3]. Interviewees included 29 breeders, 8 policy and legal specialists, 8 gene bank managers 
and 25 other scientists from natural resource management, geographic information systems, and the 
social sciences. 
4. Operations of the CGIAR Gene Banks and Breeding Programmes in the Last Decade 
In order to understand how policies affect the work of the CGIAR centers, we will first describe 
how the centers’ gene banks and breeding programs operate. The work of the centers has not remained 
static since their establishment, but it has evolved to respond and adapt to the changing needs and 
priorities of their national partners, new roles played by emerging actors and gaps left by traditional 
institutions which are progressively vanishing, pressures of international donors and evolving policy 
and legal frameworks. In the following sections, in addition to providing an overall picture of how the 
centers work, we try to highlight the centers’ operative changes that have either increased their 
exposure to evolving policy and legal frameworks or resulted from their efforts to respond to such 
policies and legal frameworks. One example of the former is the increasing collaboration between the 
centers and the private sector, in some cases through research consortia. An example of the latter is the 
centers’ progressive involvement in the dissemination of improved plant varieties to farmers and the 
development and implementation of locally adapted seed laws. Later in the paper we will refer back to 
the operative changes presented in this section to analyze the increased influence of certain policies on 
the centers’ capacities to use and disseminate germplasm. 
4.1. CGIAR Gene Banks 
4.1.1. Operation of the Gene Banks 
Most of the international ex situ collections of plant genetic resources currently conserved by 11 of 
the CGIAR gene banks began as working collections used by teams of scientists both inside and 
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outside the CGIAR. Over time, the centers accepted responsibility for maintaining the collections on 
behalf of the international community, subject to internationally recognized standards. They agreed to 
provide global-facilitated access to these collections for the purposes of agricultural research and 
development, conservation and breeding. The gene banks redistribute samples of the materials they 
received (and keep as accessions) to countries all over the world. The CGIAR collections currently 
include 693,766 accessions of PGRFA, originally collected from 195 countries. Between 1979 and 
2009, the centers’ gene banks distributed materials to 178 countries [4]. Figure 2 shows the range of 
countries that have received samples of material through the CGIAR gene banks over this period. 
Figure 2. Number of samples sent to countries by CGIAR gene banks (1979–2009) [5]. 
Source: SINGER [4]. 
 
The CGIAR centers have traditionally acquired materials either from other pre-existing ex situ 
collections or from missions to collect materials from in situ conditions. Collecting missions are 
usually organized in cooperation with national partners. Subsamples of the materials collected are 
deposited with the national partners (in the national gene bank if there is one) with the understanding 
that copies of the germplasm collected will be forwarded to the centers. 
Over the years, the numbers of new, unique acquisitions have dropped considerably (a trend that 
began around 1992), except for a slight increase in the most recent period. This atypical increase is due 
to the efforts of an international “regeneration” project supported by the Global Crop Diversity Trust 
(GCDT) and the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation. Between 2008 and 2010 (inclusive), 20 
developing countries sent samples of over 14,500 regenerated accessions to various CGIAR gene 
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banks [6]. Figure 3 shows the trend line in the annual number of unique acquisitions between 1979  
and 2009. 
Figure 3. Trend in annual acquisitions of unique accessions entering the CGIAR 
collections from 1979 to 2009. Source: SINGER [4]. 
 
The CGIAR centers generally make materials available to anyone—organization or individual—who 
requests it for the allowed purposes, for free or for a minimal fee. They may decline to provide 
materials if they do not have sufficient samples in stock. The CGIAR gene banks, together with the 
geneb anks of the National Plant Germplasm System of the United States are the major providers of 
plant germplasm internationally. Most of the materials the centers’ gene banks distribute go to public 
sector research and breeding organizations, particularly in countries in the developing world [7]. 
Among the largest users of the CGIAR gene banks are the CGIAR breeding programs. 
Figures 4 and 5 show the distribution of gene bank accessions between 1984 and 2010 in terms of 
their origin and destinations (developing or developed [8] countries). Developing countries are 
consistently stronger donors of material than developed countries, and also the main recipients of 
CGIAR-conserved germplasm. 
Figure 4. Total number of samples distributed from 1984 to 2009, by CGIAR gene  
banks, of materials originally sourced from developed or developing countries. Source: 
SINGER [4]. 
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Figure 5. Number of samples distributed by CGIAR gene banks to developed and 
developing countries from 1984 to 2009. Source: SINGER [4]. 
 
The levels of distribution of samples from the gene banks have experienced a slight downward 
trend over the last 15 years (since 1998). The gene bank managers attribute this decrease mainly to  
(1) the increased ability of gene banks to target responses to requests; and (2) the ability of some 
requestors to make more targeted requests. This tendency towards more focused requests has also been 
observed in some national genebanks, and associated to users’ increased knowledge about specific 
accessions gained through personal experience and by examining evaluation and characterization  
data [9]. The centers’ ability to target responses to germplasm requests has increased thanks to the 
development of tools that allow gene bank managers and agricultural researchers worldwide to screen 
large plant genetic resource collections more rapidly and accurately than was previously possible using 
traditional methods. The tool Focused Identification of Germplasm Strategy (FIGS), developed by the 
International Centre for Agricultural Research in the Dry Areas (ICARDA), is an important step in  
this direction [10]. 
4.1.2. The Status of CGIAR Gene Banks in an Evolving International System of PGRFA Conservation, 
Exchange and Use 
The rights and responsibilities of the CGIAR centers concerning the ex situ collections have 
gradually been formalized through international legal agreements. In 1994, the centers hosting 
international collections—12 at the time—signed agreements with the Food and Agriculture 
Organization of the United Nations (FAO) to hold designated germplasm in trust for the benefit of the 
international community and to make samples of the designated germplasm and related information 
available directly to users or through FAO, for the purpose of scientific research, plant breeding or 
genetic resource conservation, without restriction [11]. The centers developed their own guidelines 
stating that they would designate germplasm as being “in-trust”, that they had the legal right to make it 
globally available and that they intended to make long-term conservation commitments. The centers 
adopted a material transfer agreement (MTA) for distributing in-trust materials, stating that in-trust 
materials could be made available for direct use by farmers. Under this agreement, the centers 
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subjected themselves to the overall policy guidance of the FAO’s Commission on Genetic Resources 
for Food and Agriculture (CGRFA) as far as issues related to the management of the in-trust materials 
were concerned. The in-trust agreements were a stop-gap measure meant to clarify the legal status of 
the collections until the negotiations of the International Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources for Food 
and Agriculture (ITPGRFA) were concluded. In 2006, 11 centers hosting collections signed 
agreements with the governing body of the treaty placing their in-trust collections under the purview of 
the Treaty [12]. Thus, the centers subjected themselves to the overall policy guidance of the governing 
body with respect to the management of their collections and undertook to use the treaty’s Standard 
Material Transfer Agreement (SMTA) when distributing materials they held “in trust” or that 
incorporated materials from the multilateral system. As a result of the way things have developed, the 
materials that the centres actually distribute under the SMTA includes materials designated as  
“in trust” under the 1994 agreements, materials the centers received under the SMTA, and materials 
they received under some other instrument with permission to redistribute that material by using  
the SMTA [13]. 
4.2. CGIAR Breeding Programs 
4.2.1. Operation of the Breeding Programs 
The contribution of international agricultural research—particularly, the CGIAR centers’ efforts to 
improve crops through yield and productivity increases—has been well documented in a number of 
studies [14–16]. The diffusion of modern varieties that farmers in developing countries are growing 
nowadays to cope with biotic and abiotic stresses has depended to a large degree on the germplasm 
coming out of the CGIAR centers, particularly for some crops like rice, maize and wheat. Countries all 
over the world have been strongly dependent on receiving germplasm from the CGIAR centers for the 
development of commercial varieties [17]. This dependency has been demonstrated for specific crops; 
see, for example, a study on beans in Latin America [18], and in various national and regional case 
studies, including Mexico [19], Turkey [20], Ethiopia [21], West and Central Africa [22],  
Zimbabwe [23], India [24], Nepal [25] and south Asia [26]. Figure 6 shows the global distribution of 
all CGIAR breeding materials for 2009. Top recipients, with over 5000 samples, were India, Argentina 
and Mexico. 
CGIAR breeding programs follow different operational strategies. We present the most salient ones 
in the following paragraphs. The choices of breeding methodology and partnerships are a function of: 
(1) the crop, its breeding biology and history of improvement; and (2) the target region or countries, 
their stages of agricultural development and their socioeconomic characteristics. 
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Figure 6. Countries classified based on the number of transfers of germplasm from CGIAR 
breeding programs in 2009 [27]. Source: SINGER [4]. 
 
4.2.1.1. International Evaluation and Improvement Networks 
For wheat at the International Maize and Wheat Improvement Center (CIMMYT, according to the 
Spanish acronym) and rice at the International Rice Research Institute (IRRI), much of the exchange 
and testing of germplasm and information has taken place through long-standing networks of 
international nurseries (the nursery model has been used since 1970). The International Wheat 
Improvement Network connects breeders within CIMMYT’s wheat program to a global network of 
wheat research cooperators, who evaluate wheat, triticale and barley breeding lines in diverse nurseries 
located in specific agro-ecological environments. Data from the evaluation trials are returned to 
CIMMYT, catalogued, analyzed and made available to the global wheat improvement community [28]. 
The International Network for the Genetic Evaluation of Rice, which was established in 1975 and 
hosted by IRRI, is a system of specialized rice nurseries that provides a vehicle for exchanging as well 
as evaluating advanced rice germplasm. The role of the international nurseries has remained the same 
over the years. However, the scope and coverage of the nurseries have grown and become more 
complex and sophisticated over the decades. Diverse entries, from segregating to advanced lines, are 
being provided to different sites according to specific requests and the needs of their local breeding 
programs. The role of such networks in the development of new wheat and rice varieties and the 
economic and social impact of such varieties have been significant [17,29]. 
Other centers have also adopted and supported the model of a nurseries network for their crops. For 
example, the Bean Regional Nursery for Low Fertility Adaptation identifies and evaluates promising 
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germplasm from a number of African countries under the program, Bean Improvement for Low 
Fertility Soils in Africa of the International Centre for Tropical Agriculture (CIAT) [30]. 
4.2.1.2. Decentralized Breeding in Collaboration with NAROs 
The centers send elite lines to national collaborators, often in the context of collaborative 
germplasm improvement projects that deal with particular production challenges. The centers’ improved 
germplasm is then incorporated into locally adapted varieties by national partners, leading ultimately, if 
all goes well, to newly released varieties. Alternatively, the centers can send well-advanced lines to 
national programs, which select the most useful ones from the populations provided. The International 
Potato Center (CIP), the International Centre for Agricultural Research in the Dry Areas (ICARDA), 
the International Institute of Tropical Agriculture (IITA), the International Maize and Wheat 
Improvement Center (CIMMYT) (maize-breeding programs) and the International Crop Research 
Institute for the Semi-Arid Tropics (ICRISAT) (cooperation with public organizations in both Asia and 
Africa on non-hybrid breeding) make use of this decentralized breeding approach. Usually, this kind of 
research is organized and undertaken through major regional hubs where the centers have offices. For 
example, in the case of CIMMYT, the four large regions are Meso-America, South America, Asia 
(India, Nepal and China) and Africa (Kenya, Zimbabwe and Ethiopia). IITA research priorities are 
defined based upon three sub-regions: eastern Africa, western Africa and southern Africa. NAROs are 
the main partners in these collaborative breeding efforts, although the CGIAR centers also work with 
NGOs, universities and private institutions. 
In this decentralized model, contrary to what usually happens in the international nursery model, 
germplasm transfer is often accompanied by a technology package as well as by capacity-building 
activities depending on the partners’ needs and capacities. While assistance to some countries is limited 
to a number of precise activities, other countries require a more comprehensive package. For example, 
some partners can cross, test, and select adapted germplasm from parental lines and segregating materials 
provided by the CGIAR centers, but others require nearly finished varieties. As part of capacity 
building in plant breeding, centers provide various training opportunities to national breeders, from 
visits to centers’ experimental stations to up to two years’ stays in the centers’ breeding programs. 
In their collaborative breeding projects with NAROs, some of the CGIAR centers have gained 
experience with comprehensive forms of participation. These experiences include participatory plant 
breeding (PPB), participatory variety selection (PVS) and the organization of “open house” and farmer 
field days. PPB involves farmers in the decision-making process about breeding priorities and 
strategies; PVS involves farmers in the evaluation of materials, sometimes from early on (F2 and F3) 
but, more regularly, in the final stages of the breeding process. PVS that is used in the early evaluation 
stages allows for the selection and further development of particular farmer-preferred traits. Open 
house and farmers’ field days are usually one-day events during which collections of experimental 
materials on station or in farmer’s fields can be freely visited for on-site evaluation (sometimes 
including culinary tasting as well). From 1997 until recently, PPB and PVS were championed by the 
CGIAR System-wide Program on Participatory Research and Gender Analysis, which was convened 
by CIAT and co-sponsored by CIMYYT, ICARDA and IRRI. For a number of years, these four centers, 
plus ICRISAT, Africa Rice Center (previously West Africa Rice Development Association—WARDA) 
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and CIP, piloted participatory crop improvement in a number of projects, some of them in close 
collaboration with NAROs and NGOs [31]. The program ended in 2011 [32]. 
At present, participatory plant breeding only exists as a sub-program at one of the centers, 
ICARDA, and is housed within its participatory research program [33]. ICARDA has extended its 
original PPB work piloted on barley in Morocco, Syria and Tunisia to other countries and other crops 
in North Africa and the Middle East. In 2010, for example, ICARDA and its national partners started 
an innovative breeding program in four pilot zones of Eritrea. Farmers, researchers and extension staff 
jointly evaluated a wide range of crop varieties of barley, wheat, lentil, fava bean and chickpea, both 
indigenous and introduced, to select promising ones for crop improvement. To accelerate the 
dissemination of new varieties, a farmer seed co-operative was established in one of the zones. A group 
of pilot farmers was provided with “nucleus” seed of new varieties developed by the project, together 
with training on seed production, quality control and storage [34]. ICARDA has used this participatory 
approach to set up village-based seed production units in several countries, including Jordan [35]. 
Participatory variety selection (used in different stages) has gained ground in the CGIAR and is 
practiced in a number of programs and projects carried out by CIAT, CIP, ICRISAT and IRRI. CIP 
carries out PPB and PVS work through national partner organizations [36] and regional networks, such 
as INIA in Peru and the National Crops Research Institute in Uganda [37]. 
IRRI, which piloted PPB in East India in 1997, at present uses PVS to pay attention to end-user 
needs, including the development and strengthening of seed production systems [38]. Examples are the 
IRRI-Japan Submergence project for Southeast Asia [39] and the Consortium for an Unfavourable 
Rice Environment (CURE) [40]. CURE uses a partnership-building approach and combines research 
and extension, representing a relatively new direction for IRRI. In Central and West Africa, ICRISAT 
uses PVS in some projects—for example, on groundnuts [41,42]. 
4.2.1.3. Hybrid Research Consortia 
In the hybrid consortium model, private companies use elite hybrid parents from the CGIAR centers 
to develop hybrids, register them and multiply, certify and sell seed. The companies assume 
responsibility for crossing the parents and for registering and marketing the varieties. The centers take 
advantage of the companies’ capacity to maintain and cross the parental lines and multiply and 
distribute hybrid seed. The CGIAR centers draw on their strengths as upstream breeders with access 
and capacity to identify and introduce useful traits from the genetic diversity of the crops concerned. 
The role of centers in promoting and supporting the adoption of varieties developed by consortium 
members is limited. This distribution of responsibility between the two partners—upstream 
development of parental lines by CGIAR breeders and downstream crossing, maintenance and 
marketing by private companies—is possible as a result of the high technical capacity of the 
companies involved and the supportive policy environments in which they operate. For example, in 
India, variety registration is mandatory for all crop varieties but seed certification is not obligatory for 
the private sector. Most private seed is sold as “truthfully labeled”, requiring the name of the variety 
and minimum germination and purity standards [43,44]. The companies, which generally have more 
resources than do public sector actors to test and register varieties quickly, are further supported by this 
Resources 2013, 2 242 
 
 
flexible treatment in national seed laws to get the technologies tested, approved and made available to 
the market more quickly and more cheaply. 
At present, CIMMYT, ICRISAT and IRRI are engaged in hybrid-technology development in maize, 
pearl millet, sorghum, pigeon peas and rice. At ICRISAT and IRRI, the delivery of improved hybrid 
lines takes place through the consortia, mostly to private sector companies including those from 
developed countries. ICRISAT shares its parental lines through the Sorghum, Pearl Millet, and 
Pigeonpea Hybrid Parents Research Consortia, which were established in 2000 and 2004 and are 
predominantly active in India. Members of the consortia pay an annual fee in order to receive 
information and get access and use of ICRISAT’s improved lines. ICRISAT’s parental lines remain in 
the public domain and are available to public sector institutions for free at all stages of development [45]. 
However, NAROs generally do not ask for ICRISAT materials because they do not have the capacity 
to maintain and cross the parental lines or to multiply and supply hybrid seed to users. Advisory 
committees (comprised of members from private seed companies and ICRISAT) provide guidance and 
advice for the consortia’s research and development activities. The Hybrid Rice Development Consortium, 
which was established by IRRI in 2008, uses a similar approach but with an international scope. 
Apart from these major models, the CGIAR centers also transfer improved germplasm in response 
to individual requests, which are not necessarily part of standing partnerships nor associated with a 
particular project. Information about materials that are available upon request is shared through annual, 
online catalogues and through e-mail lists. Some programs, such as those on lentil and grasspea at 
ICARDA and those on chickpea at ICRISAT, regularly organize open-door sessions where scientists 
from all over the region are invited to visit the CGIAR Centre and request promising lines. 
4.2.2. Technology Generation and Dissemination Practices 
Different perspectives have been adopted to conceptualize the processes of technology development 
and diffusion [46,47]. In the field of agricultural technology development, including crop 
improvement, models tend to be divided into two groups. The first includes those models that respond 
to a classic, linear and functionalistic approach where innovations are seen to move progressively from 
advanced agricultural research institutions, to national agricultural systems, to national extension 
systems and, finally, to farmers. The second group includes models that do not assume that innovation 
systems function smoothly in a top–down and linear manner. Rather, they focus on how different 
actors make use of different sources of information, relationships and technologies to actively 
construct (or hinder) the process of innovation, including farmers, community organizations and  
non-government organizations (NGOs) [48,49]. Traditionally, the work of the CGIAR centers has 
responded to the first model, and only recently the second model has started to inspire new approaches 
in the CGIAR operations. In this section, we will explain why and how this shift has taken place. 
In general, the CGIAR centers have not been called on to manage the dissemination of improved 
germplasm to those who would grow and market such varieties. Their work was supposed to end with 
the delivery of improved lines to national (usually public sector) partners, who would then typically 
cross them with locally adapted materials, or select the best-suited lines, and release, multiply and 
distribute them. In this traditional model, the CGIAR centers, in collaboration with national research 
institutions, have been seen as the sole source of technology. The centers, as technology originators, 
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have historically depended on intermediaries for the distribution of new technologies [50]. However, 
the criticism has been made that the experiences, knowledge, interests and resources of germplasm 
end-users (men and women farmers) are often overlooked in the traditional model, because the  
end-users have been considered passive users of the technologies [46]. 
Many assessments of the adoption and impact of CGIAR breeding activities have been conducted. 
Many of them report relatively high levels of uptake of modern varieties developed with CGIAR 
germplasm. However, these results need to be interpreted with caution. Some of the studies are biased 
by the fact that they only cover regions where a particular crop is most important or areas that have 
profited from substantial technology promotion, often through the project(s) that is/are sponsoring the 
study, which can easily lead to over-estimation. Another shortcoming is that the nature of “adoption” 
in these assessments has rarely been specified, making it unclear what proportions of the farmers’ 
fields are planted with the new varieties [51]. In contrast, a number of studies reported low adoption 
rates of CGIAR material, particularly in Africa, as compared to Asia [52,53]. In these cases, the 
traditional operational strategies of the CGIAR centers and their partners have experienced serious 
shortcomings in delivering improved varieties to farmers. 
The top–down and linear approach described earlier has undergone some changes in the last decade 
for a number of reasons. First, our understanding of the processes of technology development and 
diffusion has evolved [54]. This understanding has led to different practices and approaches being 
introduced, piloted and refined by innovating scientists within the centers. Currently, technology 
diffusion is seen by many as a (more) complex and dynamic process, determined by many factors and 
actors, that may follow different pathways and uptake channels. In these alternative approaches, 
technology generation and technology dissemination cannot be completely separated—the way 
technology is developed can very much influence its dissemination and adoption. In addition, the 
institutional contexts in which research takes place will influence which actors will be involved or 
exposed to the new technology in the diffusion phase [55]. 
Second, the CGIAR centers have progressively internalized the need to document and analyze the 
impact (planned, unplanned, and undesired) of their work, partially as a result of donor pressure to 
demonstrate clear development outcomes of CGIAR research activities. Donors are demanding 
increasingly that farmers are provided with tangible, measurable development results, including an 
increased capacity to adapt production systems to climate change. The newly adopted CGIAR 
Strategic Results Framework [56] with its commitment to “managing for results” underscores the 
centers’ commitment to reform their work along these lines. 
Perceived urgency brought about by climate change has partly contributed to an increased attention 
to dissemination and adoption within the CGIAR. The rapid and efficient transfer of potentially 
adapted material to vulnerable areas is increasingly recognized as an essential element of research and 
development under climate change. 
As a result of all these factors, the CGIAR centers have made efforts to define and integrate, from 
the very beginning, a product-delivery strategy as part of their research agenda. This new approach has 
involved a wide range of actions, from developing alternative schemes of variety release and 
distribution, to creating innovative partnerships for germplasm improvement and dissemination. Box 1 
provides a few examples of such actions from various CGIAR centers. 
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Box 1. Examples of CGIAR centers’ activities to increase dissemination and adoption of 
improved germplasm. 
Reinforcing Seed Systems for Better Dissemination of Improved Germplasm 
ICRISAT has dedicated substantial efforts to develop more sustainable seed multiplication and supply 
systems for staple crops, including “minor” dryland species of relevance for climate-change adaptation [57], 
especially in cases where public channels have failed to deliver ICRISAT’s improved material to farmers. In 
India, ICRISAT and its partners have developed a method for self-sufficient reproduction of good quality and 
true-to-type seed by farmers (known as PDKV, the initials of the name of the researchers who developed it, 
Drs. Panjabrao, Deshmukh, Krishi and Vidyapeeth) [58]. CIP is involved in improving seed systems in the 
Andes. Depending on the context and local needs, CIP specialists opt for strengthening formal, informal or 
mixed seed systems [59]. They have considerable experience in working with producer groups and NGOs in 
seed multiplication, and the seed is certified through alternative schemes, such as quality-declared seed, 
which was developed by the FAO. ICARDA is unique among the CGIAR centers in having, since 1985, an 
entire Seed Unit dedicated to supporting seed production and dissemination by national partners. The unit 
assists in the development of national seed programs in the region by providing training and technical advice, 
while also supporting breeding activities based at ICARDA’s headquarters. One of the Seed Unit’s traditional 
avenues of research revolves around the informal seed sector, given its importance for many of ICARDA’s 
mandate crops and regions of work [60]. 
Consortia of Public and Private Actors for a More Effective System of Technology Development  
and Delivery 
CIMMYT’s MasAgro [61] project in Mexico supports small and medium seed company development in 
areas that have not yet experienced improvements in commercial maize production. These are rain-fed, 
marginal areas that are particularly vulnerable to climate change. The strategy is designed to develop and 
distribute non-transgenic variety and hybrid seeds to small farmers at a low cost, and provides an illustrative 
example of how to simultaneously strengthen public sector research capacity and private-sector dissemination 
capacity in ways that get needed materials into the field [62]. The STRASA project, which is co-ordinated by 
IRRI, involves NAROs, NGOs, farmer organizations and private seed companies from a number of countries. 
The foci of this project are on (1) the identification and characterization of promising and adapted local 
varieties; and (2) the improvement of seed dissemination systems based on adapted local varieties [63]. The 
Latin American and Caribbean Consortium to Support Research and Development of Cassava (CLAYUCA) 
and the Latin-American Fund for Irrigated Rice (FLAR) were created with the support of the CIAT to foster 
the development and use of cassava and irrigated rice-related technologies, respectively. Established in the 
1990s as a response to shortages of public support for research, CLAYUCA and FLAR comprise alliances of 
cassava and rice producer countries that aim to improve the co-ordination and collaboration between public 
and private institutions [64,65]). The Pan African Bean Research Alliance (PABRA) has evolved from a 
CIAT project to an African partnership program. It facilitates collaborative research within and among 
networks by providing a forum for building and strengthening linkages among multiple partners such as 
researchers, NGOs (including the private sector), community-based organizations and farmers [66,67]. 
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The adoption of a much more active role at the dissemination stage has raised a number of 
questions and taken many CGIAR breeders out their traditional comfort zone. How much should the 
CGIAR centers become involved in promoting and supporting the adoption of improved varieties? 
Does this role fall on the centers as much as on the national partners? Many breeders are not 
completely comfortable with the CGIAR’s increased engagement in development activities, not only 
because these efforts limit their time for pure research activities (particularly in those centers where 
financial resources are insufficient to increase staff), but also because release and dissemination have 
traditionally been considered the responsibilities of NAROs. Thus, some interviewees were concerned 
that the legitimacy of the CGIAR centers to intervene in this area could be questioned. In some cases 
where the centers have become very much involved in these tasks, they have found themselves in 
competition (or perceived competition) with national institutions, and, in general, it is not clear if this 
is the most efficient way of distributing responsibilities between international and national actors. 
Many breeders stress the need for the CGIAR to maintain a low profile and adopt a facilitating role in 
development instead of an executing one. 
An important issue that underlies the uncertain role of the CGIAR centers’ breeders in this regard, 
concerns the changes that are occurring in national agricultural research systems and related national 
agricultural development and research policies. In some countries, the public sector has further reduced 
its already weak presence in downstream activities. Reasons for such weakness include a lack of 
human and financial resources, low policy priority and poor infrastructure. In other countries, the 
public sector has concentrated its efforts on fewer crops, has shifted its priorities and resources to other 
activities (for example, biotechnology) or has begun to privatize certain services, for instance, seed 
production and marketing and agricultural extension. 
In some other countries, however, there has been an increase in the public sector’s interest and 
efforts in relation, for example, to the dissemination of improved varieties and seed production. As 
some of the interviewees mentioned, this increased interest has sometimes included requests and 
resources made available to the CGIAR centers—for instance, ICRISAT and IRRI—to cooperate with 
NAROs on these efforts. In certain countries where there is an increase in public agricultural 
investment, some of that investment is to support the centers’ direct, downstream participation in the 
seed system. 
4.2.3. Increased Collaboration with the Private Sector 
According to a study conducted by the CGIAR’s Science Council Secretariat [68], the private sector 
represented only 6% of the 3395 organizations working in collaboration with the CGIAR centers in 
2006. Therefore, the private sector’s role in the CGIAR was relatively minor compared to the role of 
its traditional partners in the public sector, but it has increased considerably in the last decade through 
new cooperative links, including those with manufacturers and processors [69]. 
The role of the private sector has become particularly prominent in the stage of technology and 
germplasm dissemination [70]. In many developing countries, the public sector has been inefficient in 
terms of seed production and marketing, particularly when addressing the needs of the small and most 
vulnerable farmers. Combined with the growth of private seed enterprises in a number of countries 
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(mainly in Asia and Latin America), these factors have led to strengthened collaboration between the 
CGIAR centers and private seed actors. 
The experiences of CIAT’s CLAYUCA and of ICRISAT’s Hybrid Parents Research Consortia have 
been documented as successful partnerships in this regard [64,71]. Enhanced capacities to test 
materials in diverse environments, guaranteed seed quality control and agile seed-multiplication skills 
have put private companies in a better position to make improved varieties available to farmers in 
certain countries and contexts. 
Nevertheless, there is no clearly elaborated CGIAR system-wide vision and strategy on  
public–private partnerships, although the need for new partnerships of all kinds has been stated in the 
2011 strategy and results framework [56]. Existing public–private partnerships have not been 
thoroughly evaluated, for example, in terms of their contribution to poverty reduction [72]. With respect 
to partnerships for biotechnology generation and dissemination, Ayele et al. [73] criticize many of the 
partnerships in Africa that involve the CGIAR centers. They argue that these collaborative efforts tend 
to be supply driven and not always linked to user demand and assert that such partnerships have often 
sprung from given “solutions” that have not been clearly linked to national development goals. 
Incentives for private sector involvement are limited in those regions that are most vulnerable to 
climate vagaries (marginal, rain-fed lands, with mostly subsistence farmers) or for crops with greater 
potential under stressful environmental conditions (legumes and dryland crops). The focus of private 
industry in these regions is on a different range crops and agricultural production systems (irrigated 
crops), which may leave the CGIAR centers no option other than to partner with public actors. 
ICARDA’s work in the Middle East and North Africa is an example. Some interviewees explained that 
the continued role of public investment and international-national public sector collaboration, 
particularly for marginal areas and “minor” crops, remains important. 
5. Policy Issues Related to the CGIAR Centers’ Access to Germplasm for Conservation and 
Breeding Purposes 
5.1. The Impact of International and National Laws on Access and Benefit Sharing 
The rules governing the access to, and use of, genetic resources have changed dramatically, as 
demonstrated by the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property rights (TRIPS 
Agreement) in 1992, the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) in 1993 and the ITPGRFA  
with its multilateral system of access and benefit sharing in 2004 [74]. While twenty years ago 
germplasm was collected, conserved and exchanged in a relatively open system of flows among 
different users of plant genetic resources, these activities are now much more subject to international 
and national regulations. The development of these regulations occurred when the internationalization 
of ex situ conservation and crop breeding and the expansion of intellectual property rights raised 
tensions among nations about who would bear the cost of conservation and who would benefit most 
(commercially) from its use. 
The transformation of international agreements that affect germplasm exchange and use into national 
level measures has proven challenging [75] particularly with regard to access and benefit-sharing 
questions [76,77]. This situation has obviously affected the operations of the CGIAR centers with 
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respect to activities that lie at the core of their mandates, such as collecting germplasm for 
conservation and research purposes and transferring gene bank and breeding material to other users. 
This difficult transformation can hamper the easy access of germplasm for research and development 
of new plant varieties in response to climate change. 
Our interviews with scientists confirmed that it is becoming increasingly difficult for the CGIAR 
centers to obtain access to germplasm for inclusion in their gene banks or breeding programs. In 
general, respondents noted that it is particularly difficult to obtain germplasm from developing 
countries, although one developed country was also mentioned in a number of interviews. Gene bank 
managers and breeders most often mentioned the largest developing countries in this regard, ones 
which have (1) a large diversity of the CGIAR center’s mandate crops; (2) strong agricultural research 
programs; and (3) long histories of accessing and using different kinds of materials from the centers’ 
gene banks and breeding programs. In this context, it is important also to recall that these countries are 
also among the largest providers of materials in the CGIAR center-hosted collections. However, most 
of these materials were collected and transferred to the centers in the 1970s and 1980s. Overall, the 
interviewees highlighted a shift away from willingness to make germplasm available over the last 10 to 
15 years, and all of them expressed strong concern about this trend. 
Most gene bank managers and breeders interviewed attributed their difficulties obtaining access to 
new genetic diversity to three factors: (1) a combination of high levels of politicization of genetic 
resource issues and “inappropriate” policy initiatives, including what they called “strong” (restrictive) 
access and benefit-sharing regulations (as a result of the CBD); (2) pressures to globalize intellectual 
property rights through international trade agreements and (3) insecurity on the part of officials about 
actually agreeing to provide materials to the CGIAR centers. Similar findings were documented based 
on interviews with CGIAR gene bank managers in 2005 and 2006 [6]. Although a restrictive approach 
has become common, it is important to point out that the interviewees noted considerable differences 
among countries. For example, scientists from a few centers indicated that germplasm access from a 
number of African countries is not particularly difficult but is limited by a lack of funds and human 
resources needed to set up strong collaborative research initiatives and the formal and informal 
networks under which germplasm can be exchanged. 
Most respondents observed that the ITPGRFA and its multilateral system of access and benefit 
sharing are not having a significant positive impact on the willingness of previously reluctant providers 
to make germplasm available. Some respondents thought that the treaty might have made things worse. 
Among the factors they cited in this regard were: the perceived complexity of putting mechanisms in 
place at the national level to implement the multilateral system; the fact that germplasm providers have 
not (or not yet) actually received any benefits through the treaty’s benefit-sharing mechanism, and the 
fact that some crops were not included in the list of crops covered by the ITPGRFA’s multilateral 
system (commonly referred to as Annex 1 crops, since the list can be found in such annex of the 
treaty), has encouraged countries to take a restrictive approach to access. Others opined that while 
acceptance of the SMTA and the treaty’s multilateral system of access and benefit sharing has been 
slow initially, providers will eventually be more willing to make materials available through that 
system. It was acknowledged that increased willingness would not happen automatically but would 
require new action by provider countries and the respective authorities in charge of implementing  
the treaty. 
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Interviewees mentioned that strength and longevity of relationships among individual CGIAR 
centers and countries were factors that helped to overcome some of these challenges. They also said 
that larger research projects, in which transfers of genetic materials are supportive of broader research 
objectives, can be instrumental. Scientists involved in international germplasm improvement networks 
noted that long-term co-operative links (for example, through the INGER network led by IRRI [78]) 
are less affected by the reduced willingness of countries to share germplasm. As explained in a 
previous section, the primary goal of these cooperative networks is to sustain scientific and technical 
work, but they also may have a positive effect at the national policy level by assuaging national 
concerns around the sharing of national germplasm and demonstrating the positive effects associated 
with valuable outcomes to research. However, the existence of long-term relationships and networks 
does not automatically imply the smooth exchange of germplasm. A few scientists pointed out that 
national policies and regulations, particularly those related to access and benefit sharing and 
intellectual property rights, have begun disrupting even those networks that used to be very functional. 
They observed that restrictive behavior by some countries is affecting the overall effectiveness of these 
international networks. 
For some crops, the relative importance of the lack of access to germplasm may be tempered by two 
factors: (1) there is considerable unexplored germplasm in the CGIAR gene banks; and (2) breeders 
have a fair amount of improved materials at their disposal. On the other hand, in all cases, gene bank 
managers and breeders confirm that there is germplasm in other countries that they would like to 
obtain access to, particularly of wild crop relatives. All of the interviewees stated that while the 
ongoing drop in germplasm flows may be acceptable for some crops in the shorter term, in the longer 
term, particularly as a result of climate changes, access to plant genetic diversity from beyond the 
international collections and extant breeding lines will become increasingly important. Shifts in pest 
and disease patterns, which are among the most significant effects of environmental changes, would 
necessitate exploration and transfer of traits that may not now be represented in the CGIAR 
collections. Prior work has shown that lack of access to new germplasm, for crops such as soybeans, 
yams, banana, groundnuts and forages, is already limiting breeding possibilities, because neither 
international gene banks nor open national collections such as the one held by the United States 
Department of Agriculture (USDA) maintain a sufficiently diverse collection of germplasm, 
particularly in terms of wild relatives [79]. While some countries have been collecting significant 
amounts of new germplasm, including wild relatives [80], only some of them report significant rates of 
providing germplasm beyond their own borders, including to the CGIAR centers. 
A number of the centers reported receiving increasing amounts of material under restrictive material 
transfer agreements and having to reject germplasm whose use is subject to too many limitations. They 
have had to refuse germplasm because they were not allowed to pass it on to other users. Examples 
mentioned by interviewees include parental lines of legumes and wild species of Zea. Problems 
derived from the inability to transfer accessions received from national partners have also arisen when 
assembling reference sets from gene bank core collections for gene discovery under the Generation 
Challenge Programme (GCP) [81]. As one of the scientists involved in the GCP explained, reference 
sets provide a representative sample of crop diversity to help coordinate upstream research by 
organizations all around the world. The omission of diversity from any collections in the development 
of these sets potentially compromises their completeness and, thus, their utility. Some breeders 
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reported other restrictive conditions concerning some materials—for example, the requirement to grant 
first access to research results to the germplasm or technology provider. 
5.2. Increasing Intellectual Property Protection and Its Effect on the CGIAR Centers’ Ability to Use 
Germplasm and Associated Technology 
Debates concerning access to plant germplasm and technologies subject to intellectual property 
rights have been chronicled extensively in the literature since the late 1970s [82–86]. They became 
particularly inflamed following the 1994 adoption of the TRIPS Agreement, which requires all 
member countries of the World Trade Organization to adopt minimum standards of intellectual 
property protection. More recently, growing attention has been paid to understanding the implications 
of using intellectual property rights to protect technologies (including plant germplasm) that hold 
promise for mitigating and/or adapting to climate change. 
Prior work has shown the simultaneous growth of applications for patents and plant breeders’ rights 
seeking control of the exploitation of plants, plant varieties and their seeds. This has been particularly 
evident in both developed countries and emerging economies [87,88]. Applications by public research 
agencies account for a considerable degree of this increase, which is in some cases enabled by public 
policy modeled on, or similar to, the U.S. Bayh-Dole Act (1980) [89], which amended the patent and 
trademark law to allow universities, small businesses and non-profit institutions to pursue ownership 
of inventions developed with federal funding. Empirical evidence of the precise impact of intellectual 
property protection on crop-improvement efforts in developing countries is scarce, however. Focusing 
on the research and commercialization of protected plant germplasm of staple crops in developing 
countries, Koo et al. [87] emphasized that concerns around intellectual property rights are overstated. 
Although both the scope and the geographic extension of protection are expanding, the preponderance 
of protection pertains to high and medium-high income countries, leaving poor countries free to tap 
these technologies. Moreover, based on the number of applications for plant patents and plant 
breeder’s rights in different jurisdictions, these authors indicate that many of the protected varieties are 
ornamentals, not food crops. In addition, most plant varieties are afforded protection that enables rights 
holders to limit or exclude others from marketing, but not breeding, the protected material. This degree 
of protection offers researchers in both developed and developing countries the freedom to use such 
varieties in their breeding activities. 
The CGIAR scientists and intellectual property specialists who were interviewed generally confirm 
that intellectual property rights are not posing a significant hurdle for the CGIAR centers to obtain 
access to technologies they need as inputs for their crop-improvement efforts. Several factors may 
account for this silence. Most of the centers did not report needing to obtain, or trying to obtain, access 
to proprietary technologies for their crop-improvement work. For some of the centers’ mandate crops, 
the private sector’s investments in crop improvement is relatively low, with the result that companies 
are not generating the elite germplasm that might be protected. Indeed, it seemed that the opposite 
situation is often the case; it is the centers that are producing the improved germplasm that the private 
sector wants to access, such as parental lines for commercial hybrids. 
Another reason that was given is that there are no relevant intellectual property laws in many of the 
countries where the CGIAR deploys its technologies. An example cited in the literature illustrates this 
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particular scenario. Many thought that the main obstacle for making the vitamin A-fortified cultivar 
“Golden Rice” available would be the large number of patents involved in the development of the 
product—70 patents belonging to 32 different patent holders around the world with Syngenta being the 
most prominent [90]. The negotiation process of the licensing agreements between the fortified rice 
producers and the patent holders lasted less than six months, allowing Golden Rice to be exploited for 
the public good (with certain limitations). The unexpected low transaction costs and the successful 
partnership between public and private actors were not the only interesting aspects of the case. Most of 
the patents identified are not applicable in the top 10 rice-producing countries [90] nor in many of the 
countries that suffer the most serious levels of vitamin A deficiency and are also major consumers  
of rice [91]. 
The interviewees also explained that when the CGIAR centers consider using advanced germplasm 
and technologies from public and private entities in developed countries (for example, molecular 
markers and other pre-breeding tools or transgenes), the technology is often outdated and the patent 
has expired or is not subject to intellectual property protection in the countries where the CGIAR 
wants to deploy them. Some breeders made reference to some cases in which the centers gained access 
to technologies subject to intellectual property protection under affordable conditions. For example, as 
part of the Generation Challenge Programme, centers and national partners sought access to  
pre-breeding advance technology owned by research institutes and private firms in the developed 
world. National and international public organizations joined efforts to get access to such technologies 
under affordable conditions. Having said all this, some of the scientists and intellectual property 
specialists who were interviewed concurred that the existence of patents or intellectual property rights 
over a needed technology increases transaction costs. They pointed out that these costs could delay 
access to, and use of, such technology in comparison to those technologies that are not subject to 
intellectual property protection. 
Breeders and intellectual property managers shared their concerns about a number of cases in which 
national institutions have protected certain varieties that had resulted from germplasm improved by the 
CGIAR centers and exploited those varieties in a restrictive manner and/or without informing the 
centers. CGIAR scientists have attributed various motivations to the national scientists’ desire to seek 
variety protection and have indicated that such actions were often backed up by national policies. They 
mentioned that there are incentives for national programs to inflate their own contributions and ignore 
those of the CGIAR centers. Government funding for national programs depends upon demonstrating 
contributions to the improvement of national production. Incentives to inflate national contributions 
seem to have increased in countries where variety registration laws and/or plant variety protection laws 
have recently been put in place or updated. As a result, breeders are being rewarded according to the 
number of varieties they register. It was also noted that, in one country, the recent adoption of a 
national policy similar to the Bayh-Dole Act [89] in the United States was creating an incentive for 
national agencies to be more aggressive about seeking intellectual property protection over new crop 
varieties. In order to deal with this situation, some of the CGIAR centers have adopted defensive 
strategies to protect their contributions. In 2005, ICRISAT signed a memorandum of agreement 
(MOA) with the European Patent Office (EPO) allowing ICRISAT to include its publications as part of 
the EPO’s non-patent literature. Thanks to this agreement, information and knowledge generated by 
ICRISAT is being provided to European patent examiners for consultation in prior art searches. CIAT 
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has intended to follow ICRISAT’s example, but a parallel MOA has not been implemented. CIAT has 
not abandoned this approach, however, and is considering signing an agreement with the Colombian 
patent office. IRRI, in cooperation with Philippine authorities, is developing a public register of 
germplasm collected before the ITPGFRA’s entry into force. The aim is to defeat spurious novelty 
claims in possible plant variety protection or patent applications over such germplasm in all other 
countries. Some centers are also considering proactively protecting some of the varieties that they have 
improved by claiming plant breeders’ rights to limit germplasm users’ ability to apply exclusive rights 
over the use of such varieties at a future point in time. Some cases of misuse of publicly-made 
available varieties have already occurred, such as a yellow bean of Mexican origin (which became 
known as the “Enola” bean, for which twenty years later that it was released in Mexico, a patent was 
claimed by a U.S. company (in 1999). The claim was successfully contested by CIAT, the FAO and 
the ETC group and overturned by the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office in 2008 [92]. 
6. Policy Issues that Limit the Distribution of CGIAR Germplasm 
The CGIAR centers fulfill a very important role as drivers in the global movement of germplasm, 
both from their own crop-improvement programs, and from the international collections of germplasm 
that they conserve and curate. In light of continued, and in some cases increasing, restrictions on the 
access to and use of germplasm worldwide, the centers’ role in this regard becomes more important 
(and anomalous) as time progresses. The collections hosted by the CGIAR centers’ gene banks include 
germplasm originally collected from 195 countries. By physically pooling those resources, investing in 
their conservation and making them available, the centers allow countries to avoid the enormous (often 
prohibitive) transaction costs they would face if they had to independently search for and negotiate a 
supply of the same genetic resources from each supplier country. This is particularly important given 
that so many countries are currently opting not to share much or any PGRFA beyond their own 
borders. If those countries had not previously agreed to allow the centers to conserve and distribute 
those genetic resources, many of them would not be available now. These genetic resources are only 
currently available due to the less restrictive, historical approaches of source countries, and because the 
centers and a few countries continue to invest in their conservation and distribution. 
In the following subsections, we analyze the extent to which policies—at organizational, national 
and international levels—are supporting or creating challenges for the centers’ breeding programs and 
gene banks to continue to act as international drivers for center-improved germplasm and germplasm 
conserved in the gene banks. We will also examine how policies affect the subsequent diffusion and 
uptake of germplasm distributed by the centers. 
6.1. Challenges Related to the Distribution of Germplasm under the Multilateral System of the ITPGRFA 
As stated above, the legal status of the ex situ collections hosted by the CGIAR gene banks was 
confirmed by the 1994 FAO-CGIAR in-trust agreements and, more recently, in 2006, through 
agreements between the CGIAR centers hosting collections and the governing body of the ITPGRFA. 
Those agreements confirm, for the first time, within the context of an international legally binding 
treaty, the centers’ ability to continue their role in facilitating international access to the “in trust” 
materials held in the gene banks (of both Annex 1 and non-Annex 1 crops) for the purposes of 
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research, breeding and training for food and agriculture. Pursuant to those agreements, the centers also 
agreed to use the SMTA when distributing germplasm that they have improved when it incorporates 
“in trust” germplasm, or any other materials in the multilateral system of access and benefit sharing. In 
such cases, if the materials are still under development, while the CGIAR centers are obliged to use the 
SMTA, they may add terms and conditions that can apply until the development process is finished 
and the final product commercialized on the open market [93]. As such, the treaty, combined with the 
centers’ agreements with the governing body, provides a solid legal basis for most of the distributions 
of genetic resources from the CGIAR gene banks and breeding programs. 
As reported in the fourth session of the governing body in 2011, during the first three years of 
operating under the treaty’s framework, from January 2007 to December 2009, inclusively, the 
centers’ gene banks and breeding programs together distributed 1.15 million samples of PGRFA. 
“Approximately 84% of the samples were sent to developing countries or countries with economies in 
transition, 9.5% to developed countries and 6.5% to CGIAR centers. 18% were sent by the centers’ 
gene banks, and 82% from the breeding programmes” [94]. 
In general, CGIAR scientists seem to have a good understanding of the SMTA and feel comfortable 
using it. Respondents in one center thought that familiarity with the SMTA and its use was 
considerable at the headquarters but was lower in regional and country offices. According to the 
experience of gene bank managers and breeders in most of the centers, the use of the SMTA for the 
transfer of material is not causing major difficulties with traditional public recipients, although there 
have been complaints about the length of the review and signature process. The CGIAR centers have 
made considerable effort to help recipients become familiar with the ITPGRFA’s multilateral system 
and the SMTA. Explanations about the multilateral system can be found on the websites of some 
centers. CIMMYT and IRRI have posted frequently asked questions related to the multilateral system 
and the SMTA, and IRRI has developed tutorials. In addition to frequently asked questions, the SGRP 
has developed a guide for the CGIAR centers to use in relation to the SMTA, which provides guidance 
on how to deal with different issues related to the transfer of CGIAR germplasm [95]. In the context of 
expanding public–private partnerships and their relevance for climate-change research and 
development, CGIAR scientists have provided formal and informal guidance on the SMTA to private 
companies involved in ICRISAT and IRRI hybrid consortia. CIMMYT staff has made similar efforts 
for public and private members of large projects such as CIMMYT’s MasAgro with the aim of 
reassuring them that the SMTA is acceptable. 
However, there are still a number of distribution-related uncertainties and challenges associated 
with the Treaty’s multilateral system and the centers’ agreements with the governing body. These 
issues can be divided into two groups: issues related to how the centers operate within the scope of 
their agreements with the governing body, and issues related to how they operate beyond the scope of 
those agreements. 
Perhaps the most pressing question within the scope of the agreements concerns “what additional 
terms and conditions can a center add when it is distributing ‘PGRFA under development’”? Can they 
restrict access to materials or seek intellectual property rights over them, or allow other to seek IPRs 
over the germplasm they have improved? Strictly legally speaking, the centers’ discretion with respect 
to the first question is fairly broad. However, for years, there have been questions raised by center 
scientists, donors, and other about the conditions under which the centers should enter into agreements 
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whereby they limit access to their research products. The recently adopted CGIAR Principles on the 
Management of Intellectual Assets [96] have the practical effect, as a matter of CGIAR system-wide 
policy, of narrowing the centers’ discretion under the treaty, by establishing minimum threshold 
justifications for centers entering into exclusive arrangements, and obliging them to various forms of 
disclosure. The Intellectual Assets Principles are new, with the centers operating under them only since 
March 2013. It will take some time before their relevance to centers distributing PGRFA under 
development are fully understood and lessons can be learned and synthesized. They will be subject to 
review within two years. 
Another frequently raised question concerns “how much money can a centre request when 
supplying PGRFA from its gene bank?” The SMTA says “when a fee is charged, it shall not exceed 
the minimal cost involved.” As the centers move into full cost recovery, it becomes very important to 
ascertain how much of the cost of conservation can be considered “minimal” under the treaty? 
A third issue has to do with the impracticality of using the SMTA when the centers distribute 
materials to farmers on farmer field days, or in the context of projects that involve participatory variety 
selection and participatory plant breeding. Often the farmers are illiterate and likely to be disconcerted 
when presented with the 12-page SMTA to approve. So far, the best that can be suggested is that the 
centers follow processes that are commonly accepted in the countries concerned for explaining 
contracts to illiterate farmers as a precursor to their being able to express consent. Even more 
impractical is the expectation that farmers will pass on seeds, through their informal contacts with 
other farmers, by using the SMTA and documenting consent. 
Two closely related outstanding issues that arise at the fringes of, or beyond, the centers’ 
agreements with the governing body, are: 
• Does a CGIAR center gene bank have the right to distribute materials for non-food/non-feed 
purposes (purposes other than those listed in the Treaty), for example, for biofuels-related 
research? If so, under what access and benefit-sharing conditions can these materials  
be distributed? 
• Can a center gene bank distribute materials to farmers for direct use? (Direct use in cultivation 
is also not included in the purposes for which materials are made available under the Treaty or 
the SMTA.) If so, under what terms and conditions? 
These are issues that have been raised repeatedly by CGIAR scientists since signing agreements 
with the governing body [97]. Two years ago, the centers also submitted a request for feedback on 
these issues to the Ad Hoc Technical Advisory Committee on the SMTA and MLS  
(TAC-SMTA) which was created by the Governing Body of the Treaty. At its third meeting, in July 
2012, the TAC-SMTA confirmed its opinion that the centers can distribute materials they developed, 
and materials they held in trust under the 1994 in-trust agreements, for non-food/non-feed purposes 
and for direct use to farmers, and that the centers should not use the SMTA for these purposes [98]. 
While the opinions of the TAC-SMTA are not legally binding, they nonetheless provide some “cover” 
for the centers and their practices, in as much as the centers can argue that they exercised due diligence 
by obtaining an opinion from the TAC-SMTA. It is also a good practice for the centers, as a means of 
demonstrating their commitment to transparency, to refer such issues to the attention of the TAC-SMTA. 
Resources 2013, 2 254 
 
 
Finally, it is important to note that some private companies and universities that work closely with 
companies have expressed reservations about receiving materials under the SMTA, and some have 
adopted policies to avoid accepting such materials if possible. In general, companies and universities 
that anticipate patenting PGRFA products are most vocal in this regard, though the International Seed 
Federation published a critique of the SMTA (presumably on behalf of all its members) as early as 
2007 [99]. However, respondents from various centers also reported that some U.S. universities do not 
accept the SMTA because the arbitration clause conflicts with federal laws to which the U.S. 
universities adhere. The most frequent complaints from private-sector partners with respect to the 
SMTA concern a number of points summarized in the following list. 
• The SMTA imposes an obligation to pay back to a “benefit-sharing fund” in the case that a 
product derived from the use of the received germplasm is subject to protection and already 
commercialized. Companies have often not heard of such an obligation, and it is uncommon, 
legally speaking. 
• The SMTA does not specify a time limit, which, in terms of duration, makes this obligation 
more restrictive than a patent. Companies are not clear whether and when the obligation 
expires. Is it in perpetuity? 
• Usually, breeders calculate royalties to be paid according to how much of the original material 
is incorporated in the final product. It is understood though that, if the final product 
incorporates less than 12.5% of the original germplasm, there are no royalties to be paid. 
Breeders are not comfortable with other “rules”. 
6.2. Intellectual Property Right-Related Challenges 
Earlier sections of this paper looked at the increased involvement of the private sector in the 
dissemination of new CGIAR germplasm, which is clearly a trend that emerges from this study. The 
involvement of private firms in the CGIAR work has raised issues related to intellectual property rights 
over what were traditionally considered global public goods. Some of the recent agreements with 
private firms have a clear commercial nature. The establishment of hybrid consortia, which were 
explained above, includes payments to the CGIAR centers (in the form of fees) in exchange for access 
to improved materials. Some of the centers have received royalties from industry’s use of advanced 
germplasm. IRRI is currently developing a center-wide policy that includes the payment of royalties 
when IRRI-improved material is used for commercial purposes. 
Approaches to partnerships, particularly regarding issues related to intellectual property rights, have 
tended not to be consistent across the CGIAR [100]. Some of the CGIAR centers address contractual 
obligations, and particularly intellectual property rights, in a formalized, systematic manner. Others 
have not had a specific procedure or policy but have tended to act on a case-by-case basis. All of the 
interviewees stressed that ensuring the wide dissemination of technologies is the inspiring principle 
behind all dissemination strategies. However, they pointed out that in order to ensure such a goal and 
to keep it at an affordable price, the centers sometimes need to accept restrictions on their ability to 
distribute materials they have developed, to create incentives for companies to invest in further 
improving or distributing the material in question. Again, the recently approved CGIAR Principles on 
Intellectual Assets set the rules for all centers concerning the conditions under which they may restrict 
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the availability of their assets (including germplasm), the kinds of restrictions they may use and how 
much information about such arrangements they must disclose, and to whom. The principles are 
expected to bring order to the range of center practices. 
6.3. Phytosanitary Requirements 
Phytosanitary requirements are central to proper germplasm acquisition and distribution. All 
germplasm samples for both import and export pass through the germplasm health units of the CGIAR 
centers to ensure that the germplasm meets the host-country import and export requirements. Cleaning 
and inspection processes become more time and resource consuming, as national regulations become 
stricter and better enforced, and as plant-safety standards increase thanks to the improvement of 
technologies used to detect pests and diseases in plant samples. Some gene bank managers and 
breeders noted that certain countries have adopted phytosanitary policies that have led to lower 
acceptance rates of genetic materials. Phytosanitary experts in some of the centers indicated that there 
are also countries that do not have the capacity to carry out all the analyses that their phytosanitary 
policies require. The result is that the countries concerned cannot accept particular germplam or they 
must request assistance from specialized agencies in other countries. This requirement, in turn, leads 
national scientists to stop making requests because they know the germplasm will not reach them in a 
timely manner or at all. 
6.4. Variety Release Procedures 
Many developing countries have established variety registration and release systems inspired by 
seed laws in European countries [101]. The adoption of the “European model”, however, has not 
always responded to local conditions. Formal release systems suit only a very small portion of the seed 
market in many developing countries. The formal sector provides less than 5% of the seed used to 
produce the traditional staple crops (sorghum, millet, cowpea) in West Africa; less than 10% for rice, 
wheat and maize production in Nepal, and from 1% to 13% for wheat, barley and legume production 
in Morocco. Around 75% of the major fruit tree resources that are crucial to the economy of Central 
Asia come from informal and local sources [102]. Limited capacities and resources of both breeders 
and national agencies in charge of variety release have resulted in lengthy (and sometimes uncertain) 
procedures to test candidate varieties. 
As the dissemination of improved germplasm gains a prominent place in the CGIAR centers’ core 
activities, national laws regulating plant variety registration and seed commercialization become more 
and more influential in the success of the centers’ breeding activities. The breeders that were 
interviewed stated that variety testing and some kind of formal release are necessary steps for 
guaranteeing the identity and quality of new varieties and for making them available for public and 
private agencies to multiply and distribute. The same breeders, however, complained about the length 
of time the current procedures take in many countries. In some cases, it can take more than five and up 
to ten years. They observed that the testing procedures at the national level often repeat what the 
CGIAR centers have already accomplished. 
Another bottleneck identified by interviewees is the rigidity of the varietal registration criteria 
(which require plant varieties to be highly uniform and stable) and the costs involved in variety 
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registration and seed certification. These two factors can put traditional cultivars and new varieties 
developed by the centers through PPB in a disadvantageous position. PPB varieties, including those 
specifically developed to be able to adapt to climate change, typically remain outside the formal 
mechanisms of seed production and dissemination as well as those for benefit sharing [103,104]. Seed 
from such varieties does circulate among farmers through informal means, but the fact that they have 
not gone through the formal registration and quality control procedures puts them in a disadvantageous 
market situation. Such seed is neglected when the use of certified seed of registered varieties is 
recommended by extension services, linked to credit facilities and subsidies, or is required by 
processors [105–107]. 
The existence of a single, officially recognized seed-supply system that includes only formal 
approaches to variety recognition discourages the development of alternative mechanisms for seed 
supply for many of these varieties [108]. The end result is that the seeds preferred by farmers (and 
local consumers) may not be available in sufficient quantities [109–111]. The potential benefit of 
decentralized, participatory approaches for germplasm evaluation, selection and dissemination in 
communities and areas most exposed to climate vagaries can be significant. Any obstacle in the 
subsequent diffusion and upscaling of these efforts, starting with the complex procedures for seed 
certification, could reduce the advantages of community-based efforts. Some of the social scientists 
who were interviewed from IRRI, for example, mentioned that they have been facing this obstacle in 
some of their work [112]. 
As noted earlier, some projects are currently underway that will put into place variety and  
seed-quality control mechanisms that also serve germplasm users in the informal sector of seed 
multiplication and dissemination. Different models have been proposed and tested to incorporate 
differing methods of seed production and supply. While keeping the formal system’s original 
objectives of providing transparency and ensuring seed quality, these models are trying to address 
information gaps commonly found in informal seed systems, by regulating the commercialization of 
traditional and modern varieties in a way that better adapts to the needs of small farmers. The Quality 
Declared Seed System (QDSS) proposed by the FAO [113] has been widely used in areas where seed 
markets are not fully functional and governmental resources too limited to effectively manage 
comprehensive certification systems. Under QDSS, seed producers are responsible for quality control, 
while government agents test only a very limited portion of seed lots and seed multiplication fields. 
The system has been recently revised with the aims of recognizing the role of national policies and 
providing clearer explanations of how quality-declared seeds can accommodate local varieties [114]. 
The CGIAR centers have been actively involved in policy processes aimed at adapting seed laws to 
national circumstances and experimenting and promoting alternative schemes of seed production, 
variety registration and seed certification. CIAT initiated such efforts in the second half of the 1990s in 
eastern Africa [115–117] and, more recently, in Ethiopia [118]. CIMMYT has made efforts in 
developing community-based seed production strategies in eastern and southern Africa [119]. At the 
regional level, the CGIAR centers located in Africa have played a facilitating and advisory role in the 
negotiations leading to seed law harmonization. The diffusion of varieties across regions may be 
limited by the country-specific seed certification rules. Efforts for regional harmonization are 
underway in several parts of the world. Through a participatory process involving the key stakeholders 
in various countries, a legal framework for the harmonization of seed legislation is being developed 
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and subsequently adopted by the regional bodies. Once implemented at the country level, such regional 
agreements can ensure that an improved variety registered in one country is automatically considered 
to be registered in other countries within the same region. Thus, seed can be multiplied and sold in 
these other countries, potentially contributing to the more rapid dissemination of ‘climate smart’ 
material and practices across regions [120]. 
6.5. Subsidies and Their Effects on Germplasm Availability 
Subsidies are a commonly used instrument to promote the adoption and diffusion of new agricultural 
technologies by lowering the initial risks and the cost of learning to use a new technology [121]. By 
overcoming temporary market failures, which offset the fixed costs of infrastructure and reduce risk, 
subsidies can enhance the use of inputs (seeds of improved varieties, fertilizer, pesticides and credits) 
for increased agricultural production, which, according to some studies, may eventually contribute to 
poverty reduction [122]. There are a number of examples of how subsidies and other public support 
mechanisms have contributed to the spread of particular crops and crop varieties. Without public 
support in the form of incentives, information and infrastructure, the Green Revolution in Asia would 
not have been successful. The diffusion of high-yielding varieties of wheat and rice, particularly in 
India and China, was made possible through strong policy support and investment in agricultural 
research and development [123,124]. Similarly, economic incentives, including subsidized seed and 
maize-based food prices, have been key in the adoption and dissemination of improved maize varieties 
in Africa [125]. 
Some breeders that were interviewed had positive impressions about the use of subsidies to support 
agricultural development. They mentioned, for example, a project initially launched by ICRISAT on 
the use of a technology package (machinery for drainage, seed and fertilizer) for the production of 
cereals in the Ethiopian Vertisols. This project reached its objectives only when the Ethiopian 
government started to subsidize the adoption of this package by farmers. However, subsidies can have 
perverse effects as well. Several studies in Africa have shown that the subsidized distribution of seed 
of major crops, such as maize, discourages seed-enterprise development in the long term [126,127]. 
Subsidies are also increasingly recognized to potentially hinder the demand for, and the use of, crop 
diversity in agricultural production. Such efforts could hamper adaptation to local climate change. 
Subsidies are generally provided for improved varieties of major cereals (rice, wheat and maize) 
through public distribution systems. This action often results in disincentives for farmers to cultivate 
other crops including those that their livelihoods depend on, such as small grains, legumes and  
tubers [128,129]. Subsidies can also have a negative impact on the use of traditional varieties of such 
crops or of varieties developed through alternative breeding approaches. Some studies show how, in 
the Philippines, widespread government subsidies for hybrid rice have distorted the ability of farmers 
to make informed choices between growing hybrid and inbred rice varieties. The result has been the 
limited adoption of hybrid varieties, contrary to the original objective. The program has not only been 
ineffective but also costly in terms of wasting scarce budgetary resources. It has also compromised the 
government’s regulatory functions and promoted corruption [130,131]. 
Interviewees confirmed that, in several Asian and Latin American countries, seed delivery and 
adoption patterns have been affected by complex public subsidy schemes, which are not exclusively 
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aimed at the development of agriculture. For example, in Mexico, the poverty-reduction program 
“Opportunities” has influenced the way in which small farmers adopt and use both hybrid and 
traditional maize varieties in a variety of ways [132]. In India, traditional crops, such as millet, 
sorghum and pulses, which are important for food security of small farmers in marginal areas, are not 
covered by subsidized public distribution systems, while other crops are, such as rice, wheat and 
maize. If seed of a variety developed or promoted by a CGIAR center and/or its partners is not picked 
up and disseminated through the state seed corporations in India, its higher, full-market cost will act as 
a significant disincentive to would-be consumers. Subsidies are also available for fertilizers, machinery, 
irrigation and other agricultural inputs [133]. The national Indian program of subsidized food systems 
for the poor promotes the consumption of foods based on wheat, rice, maize and sugar [134]. 
According to the interviewees, it is having an indirect, negative impact on the demand for food based 
on improved varieties of pearl millet, sorghum, pigeon peas and other minor crops. In this case, 
ICRISAT (and other CGIAR centers) have joined in a national campaign to have foods from a wider 
range of regionally appropriate crops included in the nationally subsidized food program. 
7. Synthesis of Findings 
The findings presented in the previous section confirm that certain policies affect the conservation 
and use of PGRFA by the CGIAR centers and the dissemination of CGIAR-improved germplasm first 
to partners in agricultural research organizations and then to final users of new plant varieties 
developed through research partnerships. 
It appears that, broadly considered, access and benefit-sharing policies are perceived to have a 
significant negative effect on the centers’ conservation and breeding activities. However, degrees of 
concern expressed about this effect vary considerably within the centers, within the breeding programs 
of individual centers and across the centers themselves. The only strong and common voice of concern 
expressed referred to certain developing countries with a long history of collaboration with the CGIAR 
and whose conservation and research capacities have increased considerably in the last decade. 
Until recently, most NAROs—particularly in developing countries—did not have the capacity to 
conserve, make available and use germplasm for breeding purposes. As a result, the understanding was 
that CGIAR gene banks needed, on their own, to collect and conserve the diversity of their mandate 
crops, and that CGIAR breeding programs were the main source of improved germplasm for the 
developing world. The scenario has changed substantially. In recent years, many of the partners of the 
CGIAR centers have strengthened their capacities to collect, characterize, evaluate and conserve 
germplasm. Some countries have initiated the building of new gene banks; for example, India, Nepal, 
Mexico, Turkey, and others have substantially increased the size of their collections or made significant 
improvements to facilities. Similarly, some large countries with rapidly growing economies, including 
Brazil, China and India, have made impressive investments in their public research programs on 
agriculture [135]. 
In this new scenario, an increasing number of national gene banks could have taken over part of the 
role traditionally played by the CGIAR centers in conserving and responding to requests for 
germplasm from all over the world, and national breeding programs with newly established capacities 
could have made their improved technologies more readily available to other countries, at least to 
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developing countries in new south–south technology transfer initiatives. Indeed, the ITPGRFA’s 
multilateral system of access and benefit sharing provides a legal and administrative basis for 
countries to become much more active as international germplasm providers of the 64 crops and 
forages included in its Annex 1. However, while the scene has been set to engage in an unprecedented 
level of global cooperation for the conservation and sustainable use of PGRFA, in practice, the recent 
situation has largely been static with many actors unwilling to assume more proactive roles in making 
germplasm available to the global community. The gradual politicization of issues around the use of 
genetic resources can explain this situation to a large extent. Developed nations’ pressures to 
internationalize intellectual property protection over biological resources, developing countries tendency 
to exert their sovereign rights over such resources in a very protective way, and uncertainty and 
dissatisfaction with the way both providers and users of genetic resources meet (or avoid to meet) their 
obligations under the CBD have resulted in a situation in which national genebanks and breeding 
programs of a number of countries do not feel entirely comfortable sharing their germplasm. 
Intellectual property rights do not seem to be posing major difficulties for the centers’ use of 
germplasm and breeding technologies, a finding which is inconsistent with much of the literature 
which warns about the negative effects of the proliferation of intellectual property protection on 
agricultural research, particularly with respect to bottlenecks created through restrictions on upstream 
technologies and processes. Our findings suggest that as far as the CGIAR centers are concerned, 
intellectual property rights questions arise more in the context of centers’ own strategies to promote 
dissemination of technologies developed by them, particularly when private partners are involved. The 
most important issue turns out not to be “will IPRs or other restrictions impact on the ability of centres 
to gain access to upstream technologies?” but instead “what IPRs and other restrictions will the centres 
exploit to advance the further development and diffusion of their own improved materials?” 
According to the centers’ experience in making improved germplasm available to farmers, a number 
of policies and legal frameworks may need to be revised in order to create a supportive environment 
for the development and effective dissemination of agricultural technologies. Among these, seed laws 
are probably the ones that deserve more urgent attention. While there is an increasing recognition of 
the role that informal systems of plant variety production, seed multiplication and dissemination and 
seed quality control play in making adapted germplasm available to farmers in developing countries, 
and while CGIAR centers and their international and national partners make an increased use of such 
informal mechanisms to enlarge the adoption and impact of improved germplasm, most laws in 
developing countries continue to acknowledge and support only formal crop improvement and seed 
commercialization methods. This perpetuates a system which may not respond to the dynamic needs of 
farmers and consumers in the developing world. 
8. Conclusions 
Our analysis highlights the ongoing importance of the role that the CGIAR centers have 
traditionally played as nodes for collecting and conserving germplasm for use by the international 
community and in developing and sharing improved germplasm. However, it also points to the fact 
that a wide range of PGRFAR users (from farmers to private companies) have a limited trust in 
internationally coordinated systems for conserving and sharing PGRFA. In the longer term, these 
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circumstances will have a serious impact on the utilization of plant genetic diversity to cope with 
current and predicted challenges to agricultural production and, in particular, with climate change. A 
growing body of literature asserts that the successful adaptation of agricultural production systems to 
changes in climate will depend upon increased higher levels of access to, and use of, plant genetic 
diversity than is currently the case [136]. This assertion has been clearly recognized by the international 
community in the revised Global Plan of Action for the Conservation and Sustainable Use of Plant 
Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture [137] and the Nagoya Protocol on Access and Benefit 
Sharing and the Fair and Equitable Sharing of Benefits Arising from their Utilization. 
New partnerships established by centers, in particular with the private sector to achieve greater 
impact in terms of the adoption of research results and products (in particular for hybrids), while 
potentially extremely important, have given rise to new challenges in terms of the kinds of licensing 
arrangements the centers should enter into with the recipients of their improved germplasm. The 
development and recent adoption of the CGIAR Principles on the Management on Intellectual Assets 
respond to the need to harmonize practices across centers by imposing some minimum conditions to 
their capacities to grant exclusive rights to commercialize research products. To what extent the CGIAR 
new principles will be able to preserve the global and public nature of most of the CGIAR products 
will be seen once the centers, in collaboration with their partners, make the principles fully operational. 
The reform of national laws regulating plant variety release and seed certification should be a 
priority for countries whose agricultural production needs to quickly adapt to changing climatic 
conditions. Participatory innovation schemes and lighter, more decentralized procedures for variety 
release and seed quality control may allow a more rapid dissemination of better adapted varieties. 
National subsidies related to seed pricing and availability need to mirror and support these decentralized 
approaches. As the CGIAR centers increase their own involvement in technology delivery processes, a 
critical analysis of their experiences with informal approaches to crop innovation and seed 
dissemination, including community seed enterprises, and participatory plant breeding, can help 
countries define practical measures to make seed regulations better adapted to their needs in relation to 
agricultural development, food security and climate change adaptation. 
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